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Abstract: This study examines the high levels of public unwillingness to
assist police in criminal investigations in Russia. Variables of public trust of
police, fear of crime, victimization, and prior contact with police are used to
explain this phenomenon. Also included in the study are variables of police
fear and avoidance of police. The findings suggest that higher levels of
distrust in, as well as fear and avoidance of police are strong predictors of
citizens’ unwillingness to assist police in Russia. The paper discusses potential
implications of these findings for the 2011 police reform in Russia.

Introduction
Strong public support and public-police cooperation are key
factors in effective social control performed by police in every society.
Russia continues to experience serious problems in these areas,
lagging significantly behind most western countries (Jackson et al.,
2011). Recent survey data suggests that despite numerous reforms in
the criminal justice system, many Russians continue to hold negative
views of their police and refuse to cooperate with them. According to
the data by Levada Center collected in 2013, only 41% of citizens are
willing to assist the police in investigation (Levada, 2013). The study
by WCIOM1 in 2012 concludes that only 45% of Russians will agree to
be a witness in a criminal case (WCIOM, 2012b). The low level of
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public willingness to cooperate with police in Russia is briefly discussed
in extant scholarship, mostly in descriptive analyses or qualitative
studies; to this date, we find no research that provides an empirical
quantitative examination into the factors responsible for the lack of
public-police cooperation in Russia. The purpose of this study is to
understand the root causes of low public-police cooperation during
criminal investigations in Russia. More specifically, we are concerned
with determining if poor police performance or fear and avoidance of
police are responsible for Russian citizens’ unwillingness to cooperate
with police during criminal investigations.
Russian police went through a tremendous transformation after
the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. During 1970s-1980s,
Soviet police experienced a period of stability with relatively low crime
rates and favorable public views (Semukhina & Reynolds, 2013). Due
to rapid political and economic changes occurring during the
perestroika in the 1990s, Russian police found themselves grossly
understaffed and underfunded while facing skyrocketing crime rates
(Sergevnin & Kovalyov, 2013). Confronted with such challenges,
Russian police officers often resorted to bribery, abuse of power and
violence as survival tactics (Gudkov, Dubin, & Leonova, 2004;
Shepeleva & Novikova, 2005). It was during the 1990s when levels of
public trust and public-police cooperation in Russia plummeted to
record low numbers (Gilinskiy, 2000, 2006; Gudkov & Dubin, 2006;
Levada, 2013). During the decade of the 2000s, crimes rates and
police funding and personnel stabilized (Sergevnin & Kovalyov, 2013).
Nevertheless, the levels of public-police cooperation remain low today
(Semukhina & Reynolds, 2013).

Theoretical framework
The criminological theory of process-based policing has been
predominantly used in recent literature to explain the issues of publicpolice cooperation. This theory often links public-police cooperation
and compliance with the public conception of police legitimacy.
Legitimacy is primarily understood as the ability of the police
institution to influence the individuals not by the use of power, but
because the individuals believe that the authority of police is “proper”,
and “right” (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). There are two main
approaches extant literature utilizes to understand police legitimacy:
the instrumental and normative schools of thought (Sunshine & Tyler,
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2003). The former is a utilitarian approach that emphasizes the “cost”
and “benefits” of cooperating with police for the citizens. This approach
focuses on associations among police effectiveness, satisfaction with
police contact, victimization, fear of crime, and public willingness to
cooperate with police (Nagin, 1998; Skogan & Frydl, 2004). According
to the instrumental approach, the conception of police legitimacy and
consequently public willingness to cooperate with the police during
investigations are based on self-interest, rational decision-making and
reasons of prudence and fear of punishment (Bottoms & Tankebe,
2012). If police effectively deter potential offenders from committing
crimes and fairly distribute police services among all citizens, the
levels of public-police cooperation remain high (Sunshine & Tyler,
2003). The instrumental approach advocates increased effectiveness of
police performance as the key factor in developing successful publicpolice cooperation; thus, past positive experiences with police are
crucial for future public assistance of police with criminal investigation
(Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Tyler et al., 2007). Furthermore, poor police
performance demonstrated through high levels of fear of crime,
victimization and low satisfaction with police are deemed responsible
for the low levels of future public cooperation (Tyler, et al., 2007).
The second school of thought, known as the normative model of
police legitimacy, is concerned with the link between procedural justice
and public willingness to cooperate with the police. The normative
school does not dictate that a simple cost-benefit analysis can explain
the public-police relations; rather, it emphasizes that people are moral
agents concerned more with issues of “proper” authority than
maximizing their benefits and positive outcomes (Reisig, Tankebe, &
Mesko, 2013). The studies on procedural justice assert that a duty to
obey police and cooperate with them comes from a greater concept of
police legitimacy grounded in public trust of police as an institution and
an understanding that the police act in the best interests of the
citizenry (Murphy, Hinds, & Fleming, 2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).
Hence, the police need "to activate feelings of obligation and
responsibility for their effectiveness" among citizens in order to
achieve high levels of cooperation in criminal investigation (Tyler,
2006, p. 13; 2013). These feelings are based primarily on shared
value consensus and understanding that the police are making
decisions fairly and transparently, and that they can be trusted in
making the right decisions for the community (Sunshine & Tyler,
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2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). This understanding is grounded in the idea
that public trust in the police institution and pertinent public-police
cooperation is a social judgment, which is based on the shared sense
of morality and is not a simple accumulation of positive past
experiences. The normative antecedents of police legitimacy are often
linked to studies on community-based policing, a model that is built on
the idea of policing by consent (Reisig, 2007). Consent and voluntary
compliance are believe to be logical outcomes of fair decision-making
by police and perceptions of value consensus between police and
citizens (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002).
Traditionally, the normative approach to police legitimacy have
been favored over the instrumental one in the studies on the processbased model of policing (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Reisig, Tankebe, &
Mesko, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). However, recently, there has
been an attempt to reconcile both instrumental and normative schools
by emphasizing that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive
but rather complimentary ideas (Tankebe, 2008, 2013). According to
this dialogic approach, police legitimacy is viewed as a complex
phenomenon where the police effectiveness mediates the procedural
fairness and the police trustworthiness, which at the end leads to the
public compliance and cooperation with police (Tankebe, 2008).
Extant studies on public-police cooperation conducted in the
United States repeatedly suggest that procedural antecedents of police
legitimacy are critical in understanding the phenomenon of publicpolice cooperation. Researchers in the U.S. found that citizens who
believe that the police treat them fairly and respectfully were more
likely to cooperate with the police regardless of the citizen’s socioeconomic status, past experiences with crime, and crime rates in the
area (Reisig, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2013). Studies on
public-police cooperation outside the U.S. also conclude that factors of
procedural justice (e.g. fairness in decision-making and motive-based
trust) are critical in predicting public-police cooperation, however the
variables of instrumental legitimacy (e.g. police performance) also play
an important role (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Murphy, et al., 2008; Reisig
& Lloyd, 2009; Reisig, et al., 2013; Reisig, et al., 2014; Tankebe,
2008).
Our study stems from the findings of both schools and examines
whether factors of poor police performance or abuse of power are
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responsible for the unwillingness of Russian citizens to assist the police
in criminal investigations. In this regard, our paper examines factors of
procedural justice (trust, fear and avoidance of police) as well as
instrumental variables of performance (fear of crime, prior contact
with police, and prior victimization) as potential reasons for low publicpolice cooperation in Russia.

Previous studies
Table 1 around here
Table 1 provides a summary of selected empirical studies on
Russian police. Available data suggests that at least 30% of Russians
routinely refuse to report crimes, and less than half of all surveyed
residents are willing to assist police in criminal investigation or contact
police in life-threatening situations. The majority of Russians believe
that the police are uninterested in cooperating (WCIOM, 2012c), and
most victims do not report crimes due to their belief that the police are
unable to solve them (INDEM2, 2007; Public Verdict Fund, 2010).
Studies in Table 2 also demonstrate that Russia's records on public
trust of police is poor with at least 50% of Russians refusing to trust
the police in any given year. Pervasive distrust of police in Russia is
associated with the feeling that the police do not act in the best
interest or share the values of the citizenry; between 15% and 25% of
Russians feel this way in any given year (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006;
Rimskyi, 2012; WCIOM, 2012a).
Both distrust and lack of value consensus between the police
and public are coupled with significant levels of police fear in Russia
with 25% to 46% of Russians reporting to fear police officers (Table
1). Whereas in other counties fear of police is experienced primarily by
members of marginalized groups, in Russia these feelings are
spreading among all groups of the population (FOM3, 2012a). Fear of
police appears to be a natural consequence of perceived and
experienced police abuse and avoidance of the police is commonly
employed by many Russians to minimize police victimization (Zernova,
2012).
Studies on Russia suggest that between 21% and 30% of
Russians are victimized every year (Bezaev, 1999; Gilinskiy, 2000;
Goriyanov, 1994; Makarova, 2011). Literature also reports that most
Russian victims are not satisfied with the results of police contact
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following victimization (Bezaev, 1999; INDEM, 2001; Rimskyi, 2012;
Shepeleva & Novikova, 2005). Research demonstrates that in the past
twenty years the majority of Russians experienced significant levels of
fear of crime or concerns with crime rates (Gilinskiy, 2000; Shubkin,
1997). Between 40% and 50% of Russians reported to fear
victimization in the last 10 years (Beck & Robertson, 2003; Gudkov, et
al., 2004; Ivanova & Shubkin, 2005; Lelekov & Tyamin, 2005;
Savel'ev, 2010; WCIOM, 2012c).

Research hypotheses:
Based on discussed literature stemming from both the utilitarian
and procedural schools, we propose that public unwillingness to
cooperate with police during criminal investigation is grounded in
either ineffective police performance or fear of police due to abuse of
power. The following are the research hypotheses for this study:
1) Public trust of police, 2) fear of police, 3) avoidance of police, 4)
fear of crime, 5) victimization, 6) prior police contact, and 7)
demographics are related to public-police cooperation in Russia.

Methodology
The study is based on survey data collected by the author in the
Volgograd region, Russia in June 2009 with a sample size of 540
cases. The Volgograd region is one of eighty-six subjects of federation
located in Southern Russia with a current population of 2,604,000
residents as of 2013. The population of the Volgograd region consists
of 90% ethnic Russians; 54% of Volgograd residents practice Orthodox
Christianity. There have been 10.5 crimes committed per 1,000
residents in six months of 2012 in Volgograd region (the Russian
national average is 8.72) and the crime rates continued to decline by
5% in 2012 since 2011 and by 25.3% since 2001.4 The Volgograd
region also averages 1.9% in unemployment rate (with nation-wide
rate of 2.1%) and the structure of population income is similar to the
nation-wide structure.5
Multistage random sampling technique was utilized in this study.
The sampling technique was performed in three stages. At the first
stage, administrative districts that most closely represented the study
population criteria were selected. This sampling methodology
permitted a variation of +/- 1.5 percent from the calculated
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proportions for each of the four sampling quota categories (the
proportion of the urban/rural population, gender, geographical crime
rate, and age). The authors calculated the sampling quotas using
official demographic information published by the Russian State
Statistical Department. Variables in location of residence, gender,
geographical crime rates, and age were used to develop the quota
elements. In the second sampling stage, public and private
organizations listed in the official government registry of organizations
within a specific administrative area were selected. Universities,
pension foundations, and unemployment agencies that included
students, retired, and unemployed populations, respectively,
supplemented the selected organizations. During the third stage, the
author selected specific individuals from lists provided by each
organization. The individual candidate list was alphabetized, and then
the author employed systematic sampling with an interval of 20-25
individuals. No quotas were applied at this stage of selection. Research
assistants conducted the surveys of selected individuals face-to-face.
Table 2 around here
Table 2 provides a comparison between known parameters of
the entire Russian population and the Volgograd region. As shown in
Table 2, main demographic parameters between the Volgograd region
and the Russian Federation population are similar with exception to
age and place of residency. The Volgograd region is slightly older, less
rural and has a higher level of college-educated individuals. However,
these differences are negligible for the purposes of this study; thus,
Volgograd region can be used as a first-cut approximation to the entire
population of Russia.
The comparison of known parameters of the Russian Federation
and the study sample (age, gender, and education) suggests that the
population and the study sample demonstrate similar age and gender
distribution. However, the sample is overrepresented by the number of
college-degree respondents. Thus, it can be suggested that the study
sample is somewhat representative of the Volgograd region population
and can be used as a rough approximation for the entire population of
Russia.
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The analysis of sample proceeded in two major stages. First,
seven hypotheses were derived from the process-based model of
policing. Secondly, the hypotheses were tested using the multiple
binominal logistic regressions due to the ordinal nature of the main
dependent variable of the study (O'Connell, 2006).
The primary dependent variable of this study, "willingness to
assist police in criminal investigation," was measured by asking the
following question: "Would you be willing to assist the police during a
criminal investigation?” Previous research employs similar
measurements to examine public-police cooperation in Russia and
reports strong measurement validity (Bezaev, 1999; FOM, 2012b;
Makarova, 2011). The independent variables included trust of police,
fear of police, fear of crime, prior victimization, prior police contact and
avoidance of police. The motive-based trust in police has been
measured through the question of whether or not "the police can be
trusted to make decisions that are right for [the respondent’s]
community". This measurement is frequently used by other
researchers of process-based model of police (Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz,
2007) and is consistent with Russian-based studies on the public trust
of police (Gudkov, et al., 2004). The fear of crime variable is measured
through a traditional question on whether the respondent feels safe
being out alone in their neighborhood at night. The question has been
previously validated in various studies on fear of crime (Ho & McKean,
2004). Victimization is measured through a self-report within the last
three years (Have you been a victim of a crime in the last 3 years?").
Fear of police is measured by asking if the respondent feels fear when
he/she sees an approaching police officer. The reputable Russianbased survey center of LEVADA used same measurement for studies
on public fear of police (Gudkov, et al., 2004).6 Avoidance of police is
measured by asking to agree with the statement “It is better to avoid
police even when you don’t break the law”. Similar question was used
by LEVADA center to measure avoidance of police and demonstrated
strong measurement validity (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006; Gudkov, et al.,
2004). A multi-item scale is preferable over the single variables used
in this study, but such a measurement instrument was not possible
due to the limitations on the survey length.7
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Findings
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 around here
Tables 3-5 provide a cross-sectional frequency analysis of main
variables in the study (public-police cooperation, public fear and
avoidance of police, trust of police, victimization and contact with
police) and the sample’s demographics (age, gender, education,
income, and occupation). According to Table 3, only 27.6% of
respondents feel it is safe to assist the Russian police in criminal
investigation and 49.9% feels it is not. While all categories of the
sample have predominately negative feelings about public-police
cooperation, some are more critical of police than others. There are
much more respondents who feel unsafe about cooperating with police
among older and female respondents. Retired individuals are also
more likely to fear assisting the police, whereas industry employees
are less likely. Those with lower monthly income (under 7K)8 are also
more fearful of cooperating with police than those with higher monthly
income (18K and higher).
Table 3 also demonstrates that an overwhelming number of
Russians (74%) experience fear when they see an approaching police
officer. Only 6.9% of citizens don’t feel this way in our sample. As
with the public-police cooperation, older groups of the population are
more affected by the fear of police than younger respondents are.
Males and females are equally fearful of police officers, even though
there are more males who have never experienced fear of an
approaching police officer. Fear of police is represented in all
categories of Russians with various occupations and levels of monthly
income.
Table 4 around here
Based on Table 4, the majority of Russians (60.2%) prefer to
avoid the police under any circumstances. Only 18.9% did not adopt
such a defensive mechanism. Similar to public-police cooperation and
fear of police, older Russians and females are more likely to avoid the
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police than younger groups and males. Retired and college-educated
individuals are more likely to avoid the police. All income groups and
various types of occupation are equally affected by police avoidance.
Table 4 also reveals some interesting findings. Although most
Russians fear, avoid and refuse to cooperate with police, a large group
of Russians (44.6%) feels protected from crime by their local police,
and only a small number of respondents (16.7%) do not feel
protected. Older Russians (51 and older), females in general and
retired respondents appear to feel less protected than those under the
age of 30. In addition, females in general and retired respondents are
less likely to feel protected from crime by police. Russians earning
high-income (18K and over) seems to feel more protected than lowincome individuals (under 7K). When comparing the findings from
Table 4 with Table 3, it can be noted that more Russians are afraid of
the police (74%) than of the crimes committed against them (16.7%).
Table 5 around here
Based on Table 5, a large number of Russians does not trust the
police (46.6%). As with the previous findings in Tables 3 and 4, older
individuals (over 51 years old), females and retired respondents are
less likely to trust the police. Younger Russians (under 30 years old),
males, and office employees appear to show higher degrees of
confidence in their police. Similar to findings in Table 4, higher income
groups (over 18K of monthly income) are more likely to trust the
police, than lower income groups (under 7K a month).
Table 5 also reports on both the contact with police and
victimization over the year prior to response. At least a quarter of
Russians (24%) were victimized in the year prior to the survey and
40.3% had a contact with the police during the same period. It is
known from the literature that between 30% and 50% of all crimes are
reported to the police by victims. This suggests that a significant
number of police contacts in our study are either initiated by police
and are involuntary (arrests of defendants or subpoenas of witnesses)
or are related to the routine work of police unrelated to crime (citizen
registration and issuance of licenses). Contrary to the findings from
Tables 3 and 4, older respondents (over 51 years old) are less likely to
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contact the police and become the victims of a crime. While females
are more likely to contact the police, they are less likely to be
victimized, which suggests that their contacts with police were mostly
unrelated to crime. Small business owners and unemployed individuals
are also more likely to contact the police and claim victimization.
Respondents with various levels of income are equally represented
among those who contacted the police and claimed victimization.

Hypotheses testing
Table 6 around here
Table 6 reports the results of binary logistic regression analysis
for the dependent variable of opinion on public-police cooperation. The
dependent variable is aggregated into two binary categories for this
analysis. Only research hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5 of this study are fully
supported and research hypothesis 7 is partially supported.
The significant predictors of odd ratio for public unwillingness to
cooperate with police during criminal investigations include fear of
crime, fear of police, police violence, distrust of police, prior
victimization, and income. None of the other demographic variables
(age, gender, occupation, and level of education) are significantly
correlated with the public-police cooperation variable. Even more
interesting, the variables of police effectiveness in protecting citizens
against crime, and contact with police are also non-significant in our
research model. The overall percentage of cases predicted through our
model is 74.2%, which is increased by 7.8% when compared to the
null model.

Limitations, discussion, and implications
Several important limitations of this study must be noted. First,
the study sample is not fully representative of the Russian Federation;
thus, generalizations to the entire country warrant some caution. The
sample is overrepresentative of respondents living in large cities, as
well as respondents with college degrees. Russia also has large
regional heterogeneity, so the Volgograd region does not fully
represent Russia's population diversity. Regions with large ethnic
minorities (i.e. North Caucuses, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan) and
large metropolitan cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg may have
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significant variations in demographics that can influence public-police
cooperation and views of police.
Secondly, the cross-tabulation statistics from Tables 3-5 should
be used only as preliminary descriptive findings. Since some of the
data distribution in the cells was skewed and not all the cells reached a
required minimum, we were unable to use non-parametric statistics to
assess the significance of these findings.
The major conclusion of this study is not very surprising: lowincome respondents that fear, distrust and avoid police are less likely
to cooperate with the police in criminal investigation because they
consider assistance to be risky. Surprisingly, prior contacts with police
and perceived police effectiveness do not have statistically significant
correlations with cooperating during criminal investigation. Moreover,
nearly half of Russian citizens feels protected by their local police
(44.6%), yet nearly the same proportion (49.9%) think it is dangerous
to assist the police in criminal investigation. The most plausible
explanation of this paradox is that the danger of assisting police in
Russia comes not from the criminal offenders, but rather from the
police themselves. In our study, only 16.7% reported to feel
unprotected from crime, while the overwhelming majority 74% stated
they were afraid of police officers.
Existing literature and examples from human rights
organizations support this proposition. Police officers in Russia are
among the top violators of human rights and appear to be routinely
involved in both torture and corruption (Amnesty International, 2002;
Chistye Ruki (Clean Hands), 2012; Committee against Torture, 2006;
Human Rights Watch, 1999; Public Verdict Fund, 2012). Literature
suggests that abuse from police inflict fear and consequentially police
avoidance and non-cooperation among all groups of the Russian
population.
Based on our findings, the instrumental approach to police
legitimacy only partially explains the low levels of public-police
cooperation in Russia; neither police effectiveness nor prior police
contact have statistically significant correlations with public
cooperation with police. It appears that citizens refuse to cooperate
with Russian police not because the “cost” of cooperation is too high
compared to the “benefits” (i.e. police effectiveness in crime control is
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too low when compared to the time and resources spent to cooperate).
In other words, the lack of police legitimacy in Russia comes not from
the substandard police performance to investigate the crimes, but
from an understanding that Russian police act in their self-interest. In
such a case, citizens deem future assistance of police unnecessary
since the police are perceived as uninterested in protecting the public.
However, the factors of police performance should not be disregarded
completely since variables of prior victimization and fear of crime
appear to be significant in our model.
The procedural justice approach appears to better explain the
phenomenon of Russian non-cooperation during criminal
investigation. Fear of victimization by the police themselves drastically
undermines images of police fairness and legitimacy in the eyes of
Russian citizens. These feelings are the foundation of public
cooperation with police according to the procedural justice approach
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Logically, voluntarily assisting the police
increases the probability of being victimized by the police from the
simple fact of increased interaction with them. Avoidance of police in
such a case is viewed as logical adaptive practice developed in the
presence of the clear danger to become a victim of police abuse.
The statistically significant correlation between the motivebased distrust of police and public-police non-cooperation in our study
supports this explanation since trust in police is the main characteristic
of police legitimacy in the procedural justice approach. Lack of motivebased trust reinforces the image of Russian police as a self-serving
agency, where the public views most criminal investigations as tools
for personal gain by police officers rather than enforcement of law and
order for greater social interest. Understandably, such views deter
future cooperation with police by the citizenry.
If abuse of power by the police is indeed the main culprit of
public non-cooperation with police in Russia, it is important to
understand the source of knowledge about such police practices. Do
such public views come from first-hand experiences or secondary
knowledge? Our study suggests that at least some of these views are
based on projections by news and entertainment media and other
sources of communication. In our study, older and retired individuals
were consistently found to have higher levels of fear, avoidance,
distrust of and non-cooperation with the police. Yet, these respondents
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were the least likely to be the victims of the crime or to contact the
police, suggesting that their fears came from sources beyond
experience. Extant literature on experienced police abuse also
supports this proposition since only a small number of Russians
reported to be victimized by police, yet the majority fear the police
abuse (Public Verdict Fund, 2012).
Findings from this study are consistent with previous research
on public-police cooperation conducted in other countries. Variables of
procedural fairness play an important role in our understanding of the
low levels of public cooperation with police during criminal
investigation, whereas the factors of police performance have only a
limited role in explaining the unwillingness of Russians to assist the
police. Similar findings have been found in study samples of the U.S.,
Australia and Slovenia (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Reisig, 2007; Reisig, et
al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).
Also consistent with research conducted outside U.S. (Tankebe,
2008), our study found little difference in levels of public-police
cooperation among various demographic groups. None of the
demographic variables (age, gender, education, and occupation) with
the exception of income had statistically significant effects on levels of
public willingness to assist police in our model. Previous research
suggests that such findings are typical of countries where the police
face crises of legitimacy and no demographic group offers full support
of the police (Tankebe, 2008). In this regard, our findings support the
proposition by Gerber, et al., who suggest that Russian police practice
represents an example of predatory policing, where the police officers
"prey on their society by using their positions to extract direct
payment in the form of money, goods, or services from individual
members of the public" (Gerber & Mendelson, 2008, p. 5). This
policing model is different from a model of divided society policing,
where the police in the interests of dominant elite groups
systematically oppress marginalized groups of the population (the
poor, ethnic minorities, and political opposition). The high levels of
police fear and avoidance reported in this paper are also consistent
with the predatory model of policing in which law enforcement
practices are used for the self-interest of police officers rather than to
build a consent-based policing model.
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The conclusions of this paper provide strong support for the
procedural theory of police legitimacy, which suggests that fair
decision-making and social judgment about trustworthiness of police
officers are important antecedents of public-police cooperation.
Though police effectiveness in crime control and fair distribution of
police services should not be disregarded completely, they clearly play
secondary roles in our explanatory model. In this regard, our paper
advances a theoretical understanding of Russian policing since
previous studies offered only descriptive data on the lack of publicpolice cooperation. Findings of this paper are also consistent with
previous studies on Russian police, but this paper takes our
understanding further by offering empirical evidence that public-police
cooperation in Russia is dependent on factors of distrust and fear of
police and consequential avoidance of them.
Findings from this study also have important practical
implications for the ongoing police reform in Russia. The 2011 reforms
consisted of several important measures including raises in wages and
benefit of police officers, review of personnel files for all police officers
(pereattestatsiya), consolidation of police funding under the federal
budget, 20% personnel cuts, and development of better police
assessment and reporting systems (Beck, 2013). Whereas most of the
recent government efforts were focused on improving the
effectiveness of crime control (Gall, 2011), the findings of this paper
suggest that improved police performance may not directly translate
into public willingness to cooperate with police during criminal
investigation. From our research model, it appears that overcoming
the public fear and avoidance of police and building public trust of
police should be the priority of future police reform in Russia.
One of the major issues that needs to be addressed in this
regard is growing alienation between Russian citizens and police
officers. Findings from other post-Soviet countries recommend that
increased accountability and transparency of major law enforcement
decisions are needed to create a value consensus and societal trust
that the police act in the best interests of the citizenry and not preying
on citizens for personal benefit (Beck, 2013; Light, 2013). Experiences
of other post-Soviet countries suggest that bridging the gap between
the public and police is a long-term process that may require drastic
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measures and significant government resources (Kakachia & O’Shea,
2012).
The issue of effective public accountability necessarily relates to
the question of better enforcement of laws against police corruption
and torture. Currently, the majority of bribery and corruption cases
among police officers remain uninvestigated; the few police officers
who are prosecuted often receive minimal penalties (Semukhina &
Reynolds, 2013). At this point, it is unclear whether there is a political
will in Russia to change the current situation of predatory policing and
to build consent-based policing used in other developed countries.
Taylor in his analysis of Putin's presidency suggests that Russian law
enforcement agencies in general and the current efforts to reform
them have been successfully used to develop the capacity of Russian
state-building but intentionally failed to achieve any quality of state
offered services. If the analysis by Taylor is accurate, the current 2011
reforms of Russian law enforcement agencies are made primarily to
strengthen the capacity of Russian state (Taylor, 2011). In such a
case, success of future police reforms in Russia remains questionable.
Though Russian police are almost universally viewed as
ineffective, another measure required to build an effective publicpolice cooperation is media coverage aimed at breaking stereotypical
images of Russian police force. Current relationships between the
media and Russian police are often based on the outdated Soviet
strategy to conceal any information from the media or to provide very
limited access to any information on the cases of police abuse. As a
result, media is often left with speculation, rumors and other unreliable
sources when covering a story of police abuse. In the atmosphere of
great distrust of police in Russian society, these media speculations
paint a predominately negative image of policemen and play an
important role in shaping the image of abusive police officers in Russia
(Bondarenko, 2006). Female, older, and retired respondents are
among the most frequent consumers of TV media content (MacFadyen,
2008), which may explain their elevated fears of police and
unwillingness to assist police in criminal investigation despite the lack
of victimization or direct police contact found in this study.
The situation is now becoming even more serious with the
development of social media and accessibility of the internet in Russia.
Young and college-educated Russians are among frequent internet
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users and consumers of social media content. This content is very
critical to police reputation, but is often based on unverifiable sources
(Etling et al., 2010). Several researchers suggest that negative views
of police by younger generations are often prompted by internet media
content rather than first-hand experiences (Bondarenko, 2006; Etling,
et al., 2010; Mazaev, 2004). Police violence, torture and exposé from
former police officers became a normal part of Russian internet
landscape in the last five years (Chistyakova & Robertson, 2012).
Thus, the Ministry of Interior Affairs is in dire need for a new media
strategy in which timely information and a friendly environment for
dialogue are provided to the public.
Finally, there is also a need to revise the assessment and
promotion system for police officers. Currently existing system
measures primarily crime rates and other factors of police efficiency
(Brailovskaya, 2011). Findings from this study suggest that improved
police performance alone is unlikely to cause better public-police
cooperation. Instead, the system of assessment should incorporate
indicators of public views on police including assessment of each police
contact and independent surveys of public opinions. In the current
assessment system, such indicators are only used as supplementary
measurements and they public views surveys are often conducted by
sociological organizations selected by the police themselves
(Khabarov, 2011).
This study is only a preliminary attempt to explore the issues of
public-police cooperation in Russia. More research is necessary to fully
understand the factors influencing public fear and avoidance of police.
Future research should consider a fully representative sample of the
Russian Federation to account for regional differences in public views
of police. Another suggestion for future research is to test a full set of
variables on procedural fairness of police (previously developed by
Tyler (2002)) in Russian context. Such research will allow for a valid
comparison of public-police cooperation in Russia with the U.S. and
other countries. The use of multi-item scales by Tyler also provides for
better measurement and constructs validity. Other measures of publicpolice cooperation should also be tested including the sense of
obligation to obey police officers, as well as actual crime reporting
behavior. It would also be beneficial to look at the role of media in
shaping these public views and to examine the role of police reform on
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the public perceptions of the police institution. Finally, it would be
illuminating to understand how ethnic minorities, especially labor
immigrants, perceive cooperation with Russian police and to what
extent their views of the police are different from the general
population.

Conclusion
The purpose of this research paper was to look at the root
causes of the low levels of public-police cooperation in Russia over the
past two decades. This study reveals that variables of public trust in
police, fear of police and police avoidance are important predictors of
future public-police cooperation during criminal investigations in
Russia. On the other hand, police effectiveness and prior police contact
are not significant when predicting public willingness to assist Russian
police. These findings are consistent with the process-based model of
policing which informed this research.
The study suggests that indicators of police performance do not
play an important role in predicting future public cooperation in Russia.
We conclude that the current low levels of public willingness to assist
Russian police are mainly caused by the crisis of police legitimacy due
to the lack of transparency of police decisions and as well as a lack of
trust that the police act in the best interests of the citizenry. This
conclusion is consistent with the predatory model of policing described
by Gerber et al (2008) when police use their authority for self-serving
purposes and not for protection of citizenry.
Important lessons can be learned from this study regarding
future police reforms in Russia. While it is still important to improve
crime control efficiency of Russian police, the future changes should be
focused on building better public-police relations and strengthening the
public image of Russian police. New mechanisms need to be developed
for better police accountability and prevention of police corruption and
abuse of power. Such measures include but are not limited to further
decentralization and demilitarization of police forces, election of local
police officials, transparency of major decision-making through public
hearings, and revisions of assessment and promotion system. Results
of police reforms in other post-Soviet countries suggest that
improvement within post-Soviet police institutions is a long-term
process, which requires commitment of both power agents and
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members of civil society. Police reform in Russia therefore must to be
done in conjunction with transformation in other criminal justice
institutions, especially the court system. (Zernova, 2012).
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Table 2. Comparison of Demographic Characteristics, and Crime Rates
for the Russian Federation and Volgograd Region
Criteria

Russian Federation

Volgograd region

Age:
0-4

7,955,703

(5.61%)

135,924

(5.25%)

5-9

6,880,863

(4.85%)

118,264

(4.57%)

10-14

6,564,046

(4.63%)

115,633

(4.46%)

15-19

8,495,662

(5.99%)

155,529

(6.01%)

20-24

12,256,143

(8.64%)

217,291

(8.39%)

25-29

12,257,349

(8.64%)

217,790

(8.41%)

30-34

10,798,991

(7.61%)

191,865

(7.41%)

35-39

10,068,892

(7.10%)

179,639

(6.94%)

40-44

9,193,316

(6.48%)

166,171

(6.42%)

45-49

11,247,260

(7.93%)

201,366

(7.78%)

50-54

11,260,733

(7.93%)

198,494

(7.66%)

55-59

9,747,960

(6.87%)

181,496

(7.01%)

60-64

6,896,925

(4.86%)

131,264

(5.07%)

65-69

4,479,576

(3.16%)

93,899

(3.63%)
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70-74

6,169,297

(4.35%)

133,081

(5.14%)

75-79

3,616,578

(2.55%)

68,384

(2.64%)

80-84

2,763,382

(1.95%)

58,204

(2.25%)

85 plus

1,179,354

(0.83%)

25,593

(0.99%)

Urban

103,705,314

(73%)

1,954,995

(75.5%)

Rural

38,209,195

(27%)

63,4892

(24.5%)

Male

67,605,133

(46.6%)

1,255,594

(46.5%)

Female

77,561,598

(53.4%)

1,443,629

(53.5%)

Incomplete school or lower

27,915,580

(23.1%)

517,447

(22.9%)

High school

21,276,555

(17.5%)

424,269

(18.8%)

Special professional education

48,296,055

(39.8%)

923,011

(40.7%)

Incomplete college degree

3,739,718

(3.1%)

59,181

(2.6%)

College degree

19,009,265

(15.7%)

333,628

(14.8%)

Graduate college degree

369,134

(0.3%)

5,056

(0.2%)

3,209,862

(2,211)

51,648

(1,913)

Place of residence

Gender

Education

Crime rates:
Registered crimes (per 100,000
population)
Change compare to the previous
year
Resolved crimes (per 100,000
population)
Change compare to the previous
year

-10.4%
1,638,562
-3.5%

-6.9%
(1,128)

31,206

(1,156)

-4.3%

Sources:Age, gender and education data are retrieved from the latest all-Russian
Census as of 01.01.2010. Information is available from the official web-site of the
State Statistical Agency of Russia at www.gks.ru. Crime rate statistics for 2008 are
retrieved from the official website of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Russia at
www.mvd.ru
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Table 1. Summary of empirical studies on Russian police
Criteria
Did you report crime to the police?
Yes
No
ICVS, 1992 (theft)
31.7%
68.3%
ICVS, 1996
4.6%
95.4%
(embezzlement)
Egoryshev, 1997
29%
71%
Makarova, 2011
44%
54%
Are you willing to assist police in criminal investigation?
Yes
No
Bezaev, 1999
24.5%
Public Verdict Fund, 2008
32%
WCIOM, 2012c
46%
Levada, 2013
43%
Are you willing to contact police in a life-threatening situation?
Yes
No
INDEM, 2004
29%
Gudkov, 2004
67%
Ermolaev, 2007 (police
69%
officers)
Makarova, 2011
24.8%
Do you trust the police?
Yes
No
WCIOM,1989
18.6%
26.9%
IKSI, 1996
19.5%
57.1%
FOM,1997
19%
55%
Robertson, 2004
45%
39%
Levada, 2011
35%
56%
WCIOM, 2012a
49%
Levada, 2013
48%
Do you fear the police officers?
Yes
No
Gudkov, 2004
46%
54%
Gryaznova, 2006
24%
Public Verdict, 2008
28%
FOM, 2012b
37%
56%
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Table 6. Logistic regression model for unwillingness to assist police
during criminal investigation
Variables
Fear of police
Police avoidance
Protected from crime by police
Victimization
Gender
Education
Occupation
Age
Monthly income
Contact with police in the last
12 months
Police trust

B
.311
.544
-.007
.752
.002
.163
-.113
-.160
-.351
.214

Std. Error
.143
.114
.148
.321
.266
.114
.112
.092
.120
.291

-.135

.144

Wald
Exp(B)
4.745
1.365
22.613
1.724
.002
1.007
5.496
.471
.000
1.002
2.063
1.117
1.026
.893
3.003
.852
8.590
.704
.535
1.237
.887

.874

Sig.
.029*
.000*
.965
.019*
.441
.154
.311
.082
.003*
.464
.034*

*- significant for 5 percent level
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Table 3. Public-police cooperation, fear of police and demographics
It can be dangerous to assist police during the criminal investigation When a police officer approaches someone they feel scared
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Agree

Strongly
agree

Total

Never

Seldom Sometimes Most of
the time

Always

Total

10
(21.7%)
9
(19.6%)
5
(10.9%)
12
(26.1%)
5
(10.9%)
5
(10.9%)

12 (11.7%)

26
41(20.6%)
10
99
(21.5%)
(14.3%) (18.4%)
22
43
18
102
(18.2%) (21.6%) (25.7%) (18.9%)
23
33
8 (11.4%)
92
(19%) (16.6%)
(17.1%)
25
33
6 (8.6%)
103
(20.7%) (16.6%)
(19.1%)
11
27
11
68(12.6%)
(9.1%) (13.6%) (15.7%)
14
22
17(24.3%)
75
(11.6%) (11.1%)
(13.9%)

2
(28.6%)
1
(14.3%)
2
(28.6%)
2
(28.6%)
0 (0%)

27
(58.7%)
19
(41.3%)

51 (49.5%)

57
97
(47.1%) (48.7%)
64
102
(52.9%) (51.3%)

35(50%)

6
11
48 (46.6%)
70
132
267(49.4%)
(85.7%) (36.7%)
(50.4%) (50.6%)
1
19
55 (53.4%)
69
129
273
(14.3%) (63.3%)
(49.6%) (49.4%)
(50.6%)

4
(8.7%)

9 (8.7%)

13
22
(10.7%) (11.1%)

7 (10%)

16
(34.8%)
9
(19.6%)
8
(17.4%)
3
(6.5%)
6 (13%)

26 (25.2%)

5
(12.5%)
8 (20%)

13 (14.6%)

Age:
18-21
22-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
60 plus
Gender
Male
Female
Occupation:
Small
business
owner
Industry
employee
Office
employee
Student
Unemployed
Retired
Income:
Under 4K
4K-7K
7K-11K
11K-18K
18K-25K
25K and up
Total/% of
total

13
(32.5%)
8 (20%)
3
(7.5%)
3
(7.5%)
46
(8.5%)

10 (9.7%)
23 (22.3%)
27 (26.2%)
14(13.6%)
17(16.5%)

52 (50.5%)

28 (27.2%)
10 (9.7%)
3 (2.9%)
27 (26.2%)

20
(16.5%)
36
(29.8%)
23
(19%)
12
(9.9%)
17
(14%)

18
(17.1%)
19 (21.3%)
21
(20%)
23 (25.8%)
25
(23.8%)
15 (16.9%)
27
(25.7%)
13 (14.6%)
8
(7.6%)
6 (6.7%)
6
(5.7%)
103(19.1%)
121
(22.4%)

35(50%)

40
9 (12.9%)
(20.1%)
47
10
(23.6%) (14.3%)
46
16
(23.1%) (21.4%)
10 (5%) 2 (2.9%)
34
(17.1%)
40
(22.1%)
53
(29.3%)
28
(15.5%)
35
(19.3%)
15 (8.3%)

27
(38.6%)

267
(49.5%)
272
(50.5%)

0 (0%)

55
(10.2%)

0 (0%)

111
(20.6%)
130
(24.1%)
102
(18.9%)
30 (5.6%)

2
(28.6%)
3
(42.9%)
2
(28.6%)
0 (0%)

111
(20.6%)

16
92 (19%)
(23.5%)
24
125
(35.3%) (25.9%)
14
103
(20.6%) (21.3%)
8 (11.8%)
93
(19.3%)
5 (7.4%) 44 (9.1%)

5
(16.7%)
8
(26.7%)
7
(23.3%)
6 (20%)

18 (17.5%)
25 (24.3%)
15 (14.6%)
21 (20.4%)

3 (10%) 14 (13.6%)
1
10 (9.7%)
(3.3%)

4
7 (6.8%)
21
23 (8.8%) 55 (10.2%)
(13.3%)
(15.1%)
7
(23.3%)
6
(20.6%)
4
(13.3%)
6 (20%)

19 (18.4%)
37 (35.9%)
22 (21.4%)
4 (3.9%)

0 (0%) 3 (10%) 14 (13.6%)

1(14.3%)

26
48
99 (18.3%)
(18.7%) (18.4%)
22
46
102
(15.8%) (17.6%)
(18.9%)
31
37(14.2%) 92 (17%)
(22.3%)
25
49
103
(18%) (18.8%)
(19.1%)
18
33
68 (12.6%)
(12.9%) (12.6%)
17
48
76 (14.1%)
(12.2%) (18.4%)

29
(20.9%)
34
(24.5%)
25
(18%)
5
(3.6%)
25
(18%)

5
18 (19.1%)
21
(19.2%)
(17.2%)
2
4
24 (25.5%)
31
(28.6%) (15.4%)
(25.4%)
0 (0%)
7
23 (24.5%)
30
(26.9%)
(24.6%)
3
4
21 (22.3%)
25
(42.9%) (15.4%)
(20.5%)
1
5
5 (5.3%)
10
(14.3%) (19.2%)
(8.2%)
10 (5.5%) 1 (1.5%) 26 (5.4%) 0 (0%)
1
3 (3.2%)
5
(3.8%)
(4.1%)
199
70 (13%)
539
7 (1.3%)
30
103(19.1%) 139
(36.9%)
(100%)
(5.6%)
(25.7%)

54
(20.7%)
50
(19.2%)
49 (18%)

111
(20.6%)
130
(24.1%)
102
(18.9%)
15 (5.7%) 30 (5.6%)
70
(28.6%)

112
(20.7%)

47 (20%)

92 (19%)

65
126 (26%)
(27.7%)
43
30 (21.3%)
(18.3%)
40 (17%) 93 (19.2%)
23 (9.8%) 44 (9.1%)
17 (7.2%) 26 (5.4%)
261
540 (100%)
(48.3%)
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Table 4. Police avoidance, police effectiveness, and demographics
Even if you don’t break the rules it is better to avoid the police
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Agree

Strongly
agree

I feel protected from crime by police in my city/region
Total

Completely Unprotected Neither/ nor Protected Completely
unprotected
(un)protected
protected

Total

Age:
18-21

7(12.7%)

22(19.5%) 36(20.5%) 24(16.1%) 99(18.3%)

2(7.1%)

11(17.7%)

35(16.7%)

37(21.9%) 14(19.4%) 99(18.3%)

13(23.6%)

14(12.4%) 32(18.2%) 29(19.5%) 102(18.9%)

2(7.1%)

9(14.5%)

46(22%)

33(19.5%) 12(16.7%) 102(18.9%)

31-40

10
(21.3%)
14
(29.8%)
6 (12.8%)

21(18.6%) 39(22.2%) 18(12.1%)

2(7.1%)

12(19.4%)

33(15.8%)

31(18.3%) 14(19.4%)

41-50

8(17%)

13(23.6%)

6(9.7%)

45(21.5%)

34(20.1%) 13(18.1%) 103(19.1%)

51-60

1(2.1%)

7(12.7%)

19(16.8%)

14(22.6%)

22(10.5%)

18(10.7%)

60 plus

8(17%)

7(12.7%)

15(13.3%) 21(11.9%) 25(16.8%) 76(14.1%) 10(35.7%) 10(16.1%)

28(13.4%)

16(9.5%) 12(16.7%) 76(14.1%)

27
(57.4%)
20
(42.6%)

28(50.9%)
27
(49.1%)

44(38.9%)

6(5.3%)

22-30

Gender
Male
Female

8(14.5%)

92(17%)

22(19.5%) 31(17.6%) 29(19.5%) 103(19.1%) 5(17.9%)
17(9.7%)

24(16.1%) 68(12.6%)

69 (61.1%) 72 (40.9%) 71 (47.7%)
104
(59.1%)

78(52.3%)

267
(49.4%)
283
(50.6%)

Occupation:
Small
business
owner
Industry
employee
Office
employee
Student

1(2.1%)

7(12.7%)

12(25.5%)

14(25.5%)

25(21.1%) 32(18.2%) 28(18.8%) 111(20.6%)

9(19.1%)

13(23.6%)

10(21.3%)

7(12.7%)

Unemployed

6(12.8%)

6(10.9%)

Retired

9(19.1%)

8(14.5%)

Under 4K

9(22.5%)

4K-7K

7(9.7%)

68(12.6%)

12(42.9%) 26(41.9%) 110(52.6%) 81(47.9%) 38(52.8%) 267(49.4%)
16(57.1%) 36(58.1%)

99(47.4%)

88(52.1%) 34(47.2%) 273(50.6%)

1(3.6%)

4(6.5%)

22(10.5%)

17(10.1%) 11(15.3%) 55(10.2%)

2(7.1%)

9(14.5%)

51(24.4%)

37(21.9%) 12(16.7%) 111(20.6%)

31(27.4%) 46(26.1%) 31(20.8%) 130(24.1%) 5(17.9%)

14(22.6%)

52(24.9%)

42(24.9%) 17(23.6%) 130(24.1%)

20(17.7%) 35(19.9%) 30(20.1%) 102(18.9%)

2(7.1%)

14(22.6%)

30(14.4%)

40(23.7%) 16(22.2%) 102(18.9%)

2(7.1%)

1(1.6%)

13(6.2%)

11(6.2%)

24(21.2%) 32(18.2%) 39(26.2%) 112(20.7%) 16(57.1%) 20(32.3%)

41(19.6%)

22(13%)

8(16.3%)

22(22.2%) 32(20.3%) 21(15.2%)

12(20.3%)

35(18.6%)

27(18.4%)

12(30%)

8(16.3%)

25(25.3%) 35(22.2%) 46(33.3%) 126(26%) 12(44.4%) 18(30.5%)

43(22.9%)

38(25.9%) 15(23.8%) 126(26%)

6(15%)

13(26.5%)

20(20.2%) 40(25.3%) 24(17.4%) 103(21.3%) 5(18.5%)

9(15.3%)

38(20.2%)

39(26.5%)

11K-18K

9(22.5%)

15(30.6%)

15(15.2%) 32(20.3%) 22(15.9%) 93(19.2%)

3(11.1%)

16(27.1%)

36(19.1%)

27(18.4%) 11(17.5%) 93(19.2%)

18K-25K

3(7.5%)

4(8.2%)

11(11.1%)

14(8.9%)

12(8.7%)

44(9.1%)

0(0%)

2(3.4%)

23(12.2%)

11(7.5%)

8(12.7%)

44(9.1%)

25K and up

1(2.5%)

1(2%)

6(6.1%)

5(3.2%)

13(9.4%)

26(5.4%)

1(3.7%)

2(3.4%)

13(6.9%)

5(3.4%)

5(7.9%)

26(5.4%)

Total/% of
total

47(8.7%)

7(6.2%)

25(14.2%) 16(10.7%) 55(10.2%)

7(25%)

92(17%)

6(3.4%)

5(3.4%)

30(5.2%)

3(4.2%)

30(5.6%)

13(18.1%) 112(20.7%)

Income:

7K-11K

92(19%)

6(22.2%)

55(10.2%) 113(20.9%) 176(32.6%) 149(27.6%) 540(100%) 28(5.2%)

12(19%)

92(19%)

12(19%) 103(21.3%)

62(11.5%) 209(38.7%) 169(31.3%) 72(13.3%) 540(100%)
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Table 5. Trust of police, police contact, victimization and demographics
How much do you trust the police
Completely
distrust

Distrust

Neither
trust nor
distrust

Trust

Completely
trust

Total

9(17.6%)

99(18.3%)

Contact with police in the last 12
months
Yes
No
Total

Victimization in the last 12 months
Yes

No

Total

Age:
18-21

4(11.4%)

18(23.4%)

33(18.8%) 35(17.4%)

22-30

4(11.4%)

14(18.2%)

36(20.5%) 37(18.4%) 11(21.6%) 102(18.9%) 47(23.5%) 52(17.6%)

31-40

3(8.6%)

10(13%)

32(18.2%) 38(18.9%)

9(17.6%)

41-50

2(5.7%)

8(10.4%)

34(19.3%) 51(25.4%)

8(15.7%) 103(19.1%) 46(23%)

44(14.9%) 90(18.1%) 26(21.5%) 68(17.7%) 94(18.6%)

51-60

9(25.7%)

10(13%)

22(12.5%)

20(10%)

7(13.7%)

68(12.6%)

18(9%)

44(14.9%) 62(12.5%) 13(10.7%) 51(13.3%) 64(12.7%)

60 plus

13(37.1%)

17(22.1%)

19(10.8%)

20(10%)

7(13.7%)

76(14.1%)

14(7%)

55(18.6%) 69(13.9%) 13(10.7%) 55(14.3%) 68(13.5%)

Gender
Male

12(34.3%)

31(40.3%)

84(47.7%) 102(50.7%) 38(74.5%) 267(49.4%) 94(47%) 149(50.3%) 243(49%) 61(52.1%) 183(47.7%) 246(48.7%)

Female

23(65.7%)

46(59.7%)

92(52.3%) 99(49.3%) 13(25.5%) 273(50.6%) 106(53%) 147(49.7%) 253(51%) 58(47.9%) 201(52.3%) 259(51.3%)

1(2.9%)

8(10.4%)

6(17.1%)

11(14.3%)

36(20.5%) 45(22.4%) 13(25.5%) 111(20.6%) 38(19%)

62(20.9%) 100(20.2%) 23(19%) 85(21.4%) 108(20.8%)

3(8.6%)

13(16.9%)

49(27.8%) 51(25.4%) 14(27.5%) 130(24.1%) 66(33%)

55(18.6%) 121(24.4%) 29(24%)

4(11.4%)

18(23.4%)

35(19.9%) 36(17.9%)

60(20.3%) 96(19.4%) 21(17.4%) 77(20.1%) 98(19.4%)

2(5.7%)

6(7.8%)

19(54.3%)

21(27.3%)

32(18.2%) 30(14.9%) 10(19.6%) 112(20.7%) 23(11.5%)

7(21.9%)

22(30.1%)

33(21.4%) 26(14.6%)

11(34.4%)

22(30.1%)

34(22.1%) 45(25.3%) 14(29.8%)

7K-11K

5(15.6%)

10(13.7%)

35(22.7%) 44(24.7%)

11K-18K

5(15.6%)

8(11%)

37(24%)

36(20.2%)

7(14.9%)

93(19.2%)

36(20%)

18K-25K

3(9.4%)

8(11%)

7(4.5%)

17(9.6%)

9(19.1%)

44(9.1%)

17(9.4%)

21(8%)

3(4.1%)

8(5.2%)

10(5.6%)

4(8.5%)

26(5.4%)

11(6.1%)

12(4.5%)

92(17%)

36(18%)

54(18.2%) 90(18.1%) 24(19.8%) 72(18.8%)
99(20%) 25(20.7%) 73(19%)

96(19%)
98(19.4%)

39(19.5%) 47(15.9%) 86(17.3%) 20(16.5%) 65(16.9%) 85(16.8%)

Occupation:
Small
business
owner
Industry
employee
Office
employee
Student
Unemployed
Retired

17(9.7%)

7(4%)

26(12.9%)

13(6.5%)

3(5.9%)

55(10.2%) 23(11.5%)

9(17.6%) 102(18.9%) 36(18%)
2(3.9%)

30(5.6%)

14(7%)

26(8.8%)

13(4.4%)

49(9.9%) 18(14.9%) 32(8.3%)

27(5.4%)

11(9.1%)

92(24%)

18(4.7%)

50(9.9%)

121(24%)

29(5.7%)

80(27%) 103(20.8%) 19(15.7%) 83(21.6%) 102(20.2%)

Income:
Under 4K
4K-7K

25K and up

1(3.1%)

Total/% of
total

35(6.5%)

4(8.5%)

92(19%)

27(15%)

59(22.3%) 86(19.4%) 19(17.1%) 67(19.6%)

86(19%)

126(26%) 39(21.7%) 76(28.8%) 115(25.9%) 26(23.4%) 91(26.7%) 117(25.9%)

9(19.1%) 103(21.3%) 50(27.8%) 47(17.8%) 97(21.8%) 27(24.3%) 70(20.5%) 97(21.5%)

77(14.3%) 176(32.6%) 201(37.2%) 51(9.4%)

49(18.6%) 85(19.1%) 19(17.1%) 69(20.2%) 88(19.5%)
38(8.6%) 14(12.6%) 28(8.2%)

42(9.3%)

23(5.2%)

22(4.9%)

6(5.4%)

16(4.7%)

540(100%) 200(40.3%) 296(59.7%) 496(100%) 121(24%) 384(76%) 505(100%)

Endnotes:
-The abbreviation WCIOM refers to All-Russian Center of Public Opinion
Research
2
- The abbreviation INDEM refers to Information Science for Democracy
3
-The abbreviation FOM refers to Fund of Public Opinion
4
-The Russian national average is 9.4% for 2011 and 18.3% for 2001
according to the State Committee of Statistics www.gks.ru
5
- In the Volgograd region 15.4% of populations' income is derived from the
entrepreneurship (16.4% nation-wide), 33% from hired employees’ salary
1
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(40.6% nation-wide), 21.4% from welfare payments (17.8%) and 5.4 % from
real estate income (6.3% nation-wide).
6
- also see www.levada.ru for more details
7
-On further discussion of construct validity for procedural justice variables
see Reisig et al (2007)
8
- The monthly income is measured in Russian rubles. The currency rate is
approximately $1 to 30 Russian rubles at the time of data collection
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